NOTE: This discussion is a continuation of Monday's post by Jeff Boatman - CQA and Sr. Subject Matter Expert, QPharma. To read the 1st part of this post, please click here.
INTEGRAL SOFTWARE
Suppose I have three autoclaves. They’re used to sterilize final product for human implantation: major potential for serious health consequences (and remember, you don’t get to say “it doesn’t matter because we wind up testing our product”—it matters). All three of these autoclaves use software.
The first one has a separate PC connected to it, and the software resides on that computer’s hard drive, interfacing with the autoclave through a serial port. The PC is a general-purpose computer that can interface with a number of different autoclave models, and allows the user to set up specialized cycle profiles and alarms. Does that software need to be validated? You bet!
The second one sounds different, but in most ways, it’s not. That autoclave has a computer built right into it, running software with a user interface that permits customized cycles and alarms. Now there is indeed a difference: it is not designed to be disconnected from one autoclave and hooked up to another. Clearly there is some amount of scale-down that is appropriate in not needing to check that the computer can be reliably moved from one autoclave to another. But the core expectations remain the same: not only does the software, as it is configured right now, run the autoclave in such a way that it consistently works (OQ = correct temperature/pressure/cycle profiles, PQ = actually sterilizing loads); it also must demonstrably provide confidence that a range of different parameters and program sequencing will be reliably translated into actual machine operation and that those profiles are consistently implemented. That’s a qualification that goes beyond simply how the machine itself operates: it is software validation. We may have used a risk assessment to scale down the amount of testing needed, but there is definitely a separate software aspect to this.
Now consider the third example. This autoclave is computerized, but the software is programmed for one specific cycle profile; it is not customizable. There are a couple of ways this could be done: the autoclave could truly be a one-trick pony, with the computer no more customizable than a four-function calculator; or more and more commonly, the software is customizable, but the manufacturer has decided that the configuration will be “locked down” and never changed, at least not outside formal change control (which includes, of course, a process for evaluating changes for the need to perform re-validation).
I contend that in this last example, the whole concept of “software validation” goes out the window. If indeed the system has any potential for changing settings and parameters, then certainly you must both explain the measures used to preclude anyone from making unauthorized and unvalidated changes, and then demonstrate the effectiveness of those controls; and if the autoclave electronically captures or transmits any digital records that are used for GxP purposes, then validation for Part 11 may still apply. Those could include actual cycle monitoring records, any data input by users such as batch identification, or confirming the identity of authorized users.
But provided you have covered these Part 11 items, there is no regulatory obligation to...